Obtaining a Default Judgment

Obtaining a Default Judgment

Superior Court of New Jersey – Special Civil Part Small Claims and Regular Special Civil Part Cases

If you sue someone by filing a complaint against him or her, that person (the defendant) is required either to answer your complaint in writing or appear in person in court. If the defendant does not answer the complaint or fails to appear at a required court hearing, the defendant is “in default.”

Before the person who filed the complaint can attempt to collect any amount of money after defendant’s default, the court must also have a record that proves what amount the defendant must pay. This process is called “entering a default judgment.” Attached are instructions with a document called a Certification of Proof that is used to enter a default judgment against someone. This Certification shows how much the person owes you and asks the court to enter the default judgment in that amount. You will be asked to provide documentation that supports the amount you claim is owed. You must complete and submit the Certification form before you can collect any money owed.

After a default judgment has been entered in the court record, the Special Civil Part Clerk’s Office will mail you a postcard that shows the date and amount of the judgment entered by the court against the defendant. Once you have completed the default judgment process, you are considered to be a “judgment creditor,” that is, someone who is owed money. Within seven days of receiving the postcard from the court, you must notify the person who owes you the money (known at that point as the “judgment debtor”) by ordinary mail of the date and amount of the judgment. You should contact the judgment debtor to discuss payment.

Instructions for Requesting a Default Judgment:

STEP 1: Determine whether or not the defendant (judgment debtor) is a member on active military duty for the United States. You must do this because federal law protects people from certain legal actions while they are on active military duty. This is required only if the default judgment is to be entered against an individual; if a default judgment is to be entered against a business, it is not necessary to complete Step 1.

You must do one the following:

1) If you have personal knowledge regarding whether the person is in the military, complete a Certification of Proof form that explains how you know that the person is or is not in the active military service. If you do not possess this personal knowledge regarding the defendant’s status, you may not use this form.

2) If you know the defendant's Social Security Number or date of birth, contact the Department of Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) via their website or contact number (703) 696-6762. In order to access to the web site you will need to accept the DoD certificate which verifies the authenticity of the web server prior to transmitting information from the web site. To obtain the certificate and access the website, click on this link: https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/scra/scraHome.do.

3) If you do not have the defendant’s Social Security Number or date of birth, contact each of the five branches of the military, separately. You must state the reason for your request and it must contain as much information as is known about the defendant, such as full name, date and place of birth, last known address, service number, rank or grade, VIN number, driver’s license number, or other information to properly identify the individual in question.

Air Force Worldwide Locator

HQ AFPC/DS1W
550 C Street West, Suite 50
Randolph Air Force Base, TX 78150-4752
(210) 565-2660 http://www.afpc.af.mil/library/airforcelocator.asp
Make check payable to DAO-DE RAFB. Enclose a self- addressed stamped envelope. Hours: Weekdays, 7:00 A.M. - 4:00 P.M. C.S.T.

Navy Worldwide Locator

Navy Personnel Command, PERS-1
5720 Integrity Drive
Millington, TN 38055-3120
(866) 827-5672
http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers- npc/organization/npc/csc/Pages/NavyLocatorService.aspx Make check payable to U.S. Treasurer. Enclose a self- addressed stamped envelope.

Commandant of the Marine Corps (MMSB17)

HQMC
2008 Elliot Road, Suite 201
Quantico, VA 22134-5030
(703) 784-3941, (800) 268-3710,
Fax: (703) 784-5792
http://www.marines.mil/
Hours: Weekdays, 8:00 A.M. - 4:00 P.M. C.S.T.

U.S. Coast Guard

Commander, Personnel Service Center (PSD-MR) MS7200
US Coast Guard Stop 4200
Wilson Blvd, Suite 1100

Arlington, VA 20598-7200 (866) 634-0574

http://www.uscg.mil/psc/adm/adm3/locator/

Department of the Army

ONLINE REQUESTS ONLY

http://www.servicememberscivilreliefact.com/

Follow the online prompts to register.

STEP 2: Compile all the documentation and proof you have to support the entry of default judgment. There are different types of information that can be considered as documentation or proof of the amount the defendant owes you. Some examples are:

• A written agreement to pay • A canceled check
• Money Order
• Receipt

• Bill
• Agreement to Pay • Invoice
• Signed Contract
• An Estimate
• Letters
• Leases
• Photographs

Your documentation should show the date(s) the debt occurred, the specific dollar amount owed, and any pre- judgment interest (interest from the date of debt up to the entry of the default judgment). Attach all copies of documentation and proof to the Certification of Proof form. Please be sure to retain a copy of all submitted documents for your record.
In certain cases, your documentation and supporting proof may not have all the required information that is needed to enter a default judgment. If you do not have written proof of the debt or as much proof as is needed by the court to make a decision, a hearing may be scheduled before a judge so that you may testify in court as to the amount of the debt you believe the individual or business owes you. The court will decide whether to schedule such a hearing, known as a “proof hearing.” If a proof hearing is scheduled, you will receive written notice of the date and time of the hearing.

Certification of Proof
The Certification of Proof form must be completed and signed by the person with personal knowledge of the facts of the case. The form must be received by the Court within 30 days from the date that it was signed by the person seeking the default judgment. Please type or print carefully.

Line 1: Fill in the name of the person who has personal knowledge of the facts of the case.

Line 2: No information required. This is a statement which you are certifying by your signature to be true.

Line 3: No information required. This is a statement which you are certifying by your signature to be true.

Line 4: Fill in the address of the defendant/judgment debtor. You are also required to specify how

Line 5:

you have personal knowledge that this is the defendant’s address.

If defendant/judgment debtor is a business, this line is not to be filled in. Fill in only if the default judgment is to be entered against an individual. Fill in with the facts that explain how you know that the defendant is or is not in the active military service – or – attach the statement received from the Defense Manpower Data Center. If you had to contact the five branches of the military directly, attach a copy of the statement you received from each branch.

Fill in the specific dollar amount for the default judgment requested, breaking the total amount down by:

1.   a)  The principal amount due: the initial amount

of money that was paid, invested, borrowed, loaned, etc; plus, any interest (where applicable). If you are requesting interest, you will be required to provide documentation that provides for the rate of the interest.

2.   b)  court costs: filing fees paid by the plaintiff to date. If you do not know the total of the filing fees you have paid, this information can be obtained from the Special Civil Part Clerk’s Office.

No information required. This is a statement which you are certifying by your signature to be true.

STEP 4: Send completed form, with all attachments, to the Special Civil Part Clerk’s Office.

Affidavit of Non-Military service 1:5-7. Non-Military Affidavit

Before entry of judgment by default, an affidavit, which may be filed as part of the affidavit of proof, shall be filed as required by law setting forth facts showing that the defendant is not in military service. Unless based on facts admissible in evidence, the affidavit shall have attached to it a statement from the Department of Defense or from each branch of the armed forces that the defendant is not in the military service. If the plaintiff is unable to determine whether the defendant is in military service, the affidavit shall so state, and the court, before entering judgment, may require the plaintiff to post a bond in an amount approved by the court to indemnify the defendant, if later found to have been in military service, against any loss or damage resulting from the judgment should it be set aside. The bond shall remain in effect until expiration of the time for appeal and setting aside of the judgment.

New NJ law prohibits or limits most alimony

TYPES OF ALIMONY AND DURATIONAL LIMITS

      Under the old law, the court could award the following types of alimony: permanent, limited duration, rehabilitative, and reimbursement.  Permanent alimony was awarded when the parties have had a lengthy marriage or civil union marked by economic dependence and contribution to the marriage or civil union. Limited duration alimony is awarded for a set period of time when it is determined that an award of permanent alimony is not warranted.  Rehabilitative alimony is awarded to permit a spouse or partner to obtain the training and education necessary to return to the workforce and enhance their earning capacity.  Reimbursement alimony is awarded to one spouse or partner for financial contributions made to the other spouse or partner’s education or professional training. 

      The new law amends the statute to eliminate the requirement that the court must first determine that an award of permanent alimony is not warranted prior to awarding limited duration and other types of alimony.

      The durational limits established by the new law provides that for any marriage or civil union less than 20 years in duration, the total duration of alimony shall not, except in exceptional circumstances, exceed the length of the marriage or civil union.  The new law clarifies that a determination of the length and amount of alimony is to be made by the court pursuant to consideration of all of the statutory factors set forth in subsection b. of section 1 of the new law, amending N.J.S.2A:34-23.  In addition, the court must consider the practical impact of the parties’ need for separate residences and the attendant increase in living expenses on the ability of both parties to maintain a standard of living reasonably comparable to the standard of living established in the marriage or civil union, with neither party having a greater entitlement to that standard of living. 

      Exceptional circumstances which may warrant deviation from the durational limits include:

      (1) The ages of the parties at the time of the marriage or civil union and at the time of the alimony award;

      (2) The degree and duration of the dependency of one party on the other party during the marriage or civil union;

      (3) Whether a spouse or partner has a chronic illness or unusual health circumstance;

      (4) Whether a spouse or partner has given up a career or a career opportunity or otherwise supported the career of the other spouse or partner;

      (5) Whether a spouse or partner has received a disproportionate share of the marital estate;

      (6) The impact of the marriage or civil union on either party’s ability to become self-supporting, including but not limited to either party’s responsibility as primary caretaker of a child;

      (7) Tax considerations of either party; and

      (8) Any other factors or circumstances that the court deems equitable, relevant and material.

      RETIREMENT

      The new law specifies that alimony may be modified or terminated upon the prospective or actual retirement of the obligor. 

Under the substitute, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that alimony shall terminate upon the obligor reaching full retirement age, except that any arrearages that have accrued prior to the termination date shall not be vacated or annulled.  “Full retirement age” is defined as the age at which a person is eligible to receive full retirement for full retirement benefits under section 216 of the federal Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. s.416).  The court may set a different alimony termination date for good cause based on specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The rebuttable presumption may be overcome if the court determines that alimony should continue after consideration of the following factors:

      (1) The ages of the parties at the time of the application for retirement;

      (2) The ages of the parties at the time of the marriage or civil union and their ages at the time of the alimony award;

      (3) The degree and duration of the economic dependency of the recipient upon the payor during the marriage or civil union;

      (4) Whether the recipient has foregone or relinquished or otherwise sacrificed claims, rights or property in exchange for a more substantial or longer alimony award;

      (5) The duration or amount of alimony already paid;

      (6) The health of the parties at the time of the retirement application;

      (7) Assets of the parties at the time of the retirement application;

      (8) Whether the recipient has reached full retirement age as defined in the new law;

      (9) Sources of income, both earned and unearned, of the parties;

      (10) The ability of the recipient to have saved adequately for retirement; and

      (11) Any other factors that the court may deem relevant.

      If the court determines that the presumption has been overcome, then the court would apply the alimony factors set forth in subsection b. of section 1 of the new law in order to determine whether modification or termination of alimony is appropriate. If the obligor intends to retire but has not yet retired, the court would establish the conditions under which the modification or termination of alimony will be effective.

      If an obligor seeks to retire prior to reaching full retirement age, the obligor would have the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the prospective or actual retirement is reasonable and made in good faith.  Both the obligor's application to the court and the obligee's response to the application shall be accompanied by current Case Information Statements or other relevant documents as required by the Rules of Court, as well as the Case Information Statements or other documents from the date of entry of the original alimony award and from the date of any subsequent modification.

      In determining whether the obligor demonstrated that the prospective or actual retirement is reasonable and made in good faith, the court shall consider the following factors:

      (1) The age and health of the parties at the time of the application;

      (2) The obligor’s field of employment and the generally accepted age of retirement for those in that field;

      (3) The age when the obligor becomes eligible for retirement at the obligor’s place of employment, including mandatory retirement dates or the dates upon which continued employment would no longer increase retirement benefits;

      (4) The obligor’s motives in retiring, including any pressures to retire applied by the obligor’s employer or incentive plans offered by the obligor’s employer;

      (5) The reasonable expectations of the parties regarding retirement during the marriage or civil union and at the time of the divorce or dissolution;

      (6) The ability of the obligor to maintain support payments following retirement, including whether the obligor will continue to be employed part-time or work reduced hours;

      (7) The obligee’s level of financial independence and the financial impact of the retirement by the obligor upon the obligee; and

      (8) Any other relevant factors affecting the obligor’s decision to retire and the parties’ respective financial positions.

      If the obligor intends to retire but has not yet retired, the court shall establish the conditions under which the modification or termination of alimony will be effective.

      When an obligor filed an application for modification or termination based on retirement in which the existing final alimony order or enforceable written agreement was established prior to the effective date of the enactment, the obligor’s reaching full retirement age as defined in the new law shall be deemed a good faith retirement age.  Both the obligor's application to the court and the obligee's response to the application must be accompanied by current Case Information Statements or other relevant documents as required by the Rules of Court, as well as the Case Information Statements or other documents from the date of entry of the original alimony award and from the date of any subsequent modification. In making its determination, the court shall consider the ability of the recipient to have saved adequately for retirement as well as the following factors in order to determine whether the obligor, by a preponderance of the evidence, has demonstrated that modification or termination of alimony is appropriate:

      (1) The age and health of the parties at the time of the application;

      (2) The obligor’s field of employment and the generally accepted age of retirement for those in that field;

      (3) The age when the obligor becomes eligible for retirement at the obligor’s place of employment, including mandatory retirement dates or the dates upon which continued employment would no longer increase retirement benefits;

      (4) The obligor’s motives in retiring, including any pressures to retire applied by the obligor’s employer or incentive plans offered by the obligor’s employer;

      (5) The reasonable expectations of the parties regarding retirement during the marriage or civil union and at the time of the divorce or dissolution;

      (6) The ability of the obligor to maintain support payments following retirement, including whether the obligor will continue to be employed part-time or work reduced hours;

      (7) The obligee’s level of financial independence and the financial impact of the retirement by the obligor upon the obligee; and

      (8) Any other relevant factors affecting the parties’ respective financial positions.

      The new law provides that the assets distributed between the parties at the time of the entry of a final order of divorce or dissolution of a civil union shall not be considered by the court for purposes of determining the obligor’s ability to pay alimony following retirement.

LOSS OF INCOME

      When an obligor who is not self-employed seeks modification of alimony, the court shall consider the following factors:

      (1) The reasons for any loss of income;

      (2) Under circumstances where there has been a loss of employment, the obligor’s documented efforts to obtain replacement employment or to pursue an alternative occupation;

      (3) Under circumstances where there has been a loss of employment, whether the obligor is making a good faith effort to find remunerative employment at any level and in any field;

      (4) The income of the obligee; the obligee’s circumstances; and the obligee’s reasonable efforts to obtain employment in view of those circumstances and existing opportunities;

      (5) The impact of the parties’ health on their ability to obtain employment;

      (6) Any severance compensation or award made in connection with any loss of employment;

      (7) Any changes in the respective financial circumstances of the parties that have occurred since the date of the order from which modification is sought;

      (8) The reasons for any change in either party’s financial circumstances since the date of the order from which modification is sought, including, but not limited to, assessment of the extent to which either party’s financial circumstances at the time of the application are attributable to enhanced earnings or financial benefits received from any source since the date of the order;

      (9) Whether a temporary remedy should be fashioned to provide adjustment of the support award from which modification is sought, and the terms of any such adjustment, pending continuing employment investigations by the unemployed spouse or partner; and

      (10) Any other factor the court deems relevant to fairly and equitably decide the application.

      If the changed circumstances arise from the loss of employment, the length of time a party has been involuntarily unemployed or has had an involuntary reduction in income shall not be the only factor considered by the court, but rather the court shall determine the application based upon all of the enumerated factors, however, no application shall be filed until a party has been unemployed, or has not been able to return to or attain employment at prior income levels, or both, for a period of 90 days.  The court shall have discretion to make any relief granted retroactive to the date of the loss of employment or reduction of income.

      When a self-employed party seeks modification of alimony because of an involuntary reduction in income since the date of the order from which modification is sought, then that party’s application for relief must include an analysis that sets forth the economic and non-economic benefits the party receives from the business, and which compares these economic and non-economic benefits to those that were in existence at the time of the entry of the order.

      The court may establish a temporary remedy which may include: temporarily suspending or reducing support on terms established by the court; directing that support be paid in some amount from assets pending further proceedings; directing a periodic review; or entering any other order the court finds appropriate to assure fairness and equity to both parties.

COHABITATION

      Under the substitute, the court may suspend or terminate alimony if a payee cohabits with another person. Pursuant to the new law, cohabitation involves a mutually supportive, intimate personal relationship in which a couple has undertaken duties and privileges that are commonly associated with marriage or civil union but does not necessarily maintain a single common household.

      When assessing whether cohabitation is occurring, the court shall consider the following:

      (1) Intertwined finances such as joint bank accounts and other joint holdings or liabilities;

      (2) Sharing or joint responsibility for living expenses;

      (3) Recognition of the relationship in the couple’s social and family circle;

      (4) Living together, the frequency of contact, the duration of the relationship, and other indicia of a mutually supportive intimate personal relationship;

      (5) Sharing household chores;

      (6) Whether the recipient of alimony has received an enforceable promise of support from another person within the meaning of subsection h. of R.S.25:1-5 (“palimony”); and

      (7) All other relevant evidence.

      In evaluating whether cohabitation is occurring and whether alimony should be suspended or terminated, the court shall also consider the length of the relationship.  A court may not find an absence of cohabitation solely on grounds that the couple does not live together on a full-time basis.

NJSA 2A:34-25 Termination of alimony.  If after the judgment of divorce or dissolution a former spouse shall remarry or a former partner shall enter into a new civil union, permanent and limited duration alimony shall terminate as of the date of remarriage or new civil union except that any arrearages that have accrued prior to the date of remarriage or new civil union shall not be vacated or annulled. A former spouse or former partner in a civil union couple who remarries or enters into a new civil union shall promptly so inform the spouse or partner paying permanent or limited duration alimony as well as the collecting agency, if any.  The court may order such alimony recipient who fails to comply with the notification provision of this act to pay any reasonable attorney fees and court costs incurred by the recipient's former spouse or partner as a result of such non-compliance.

The remarriage or establishment of a new civil union of a former spouse or partner receiving rehabilitative or reimbursement alimony shall not be cause for termination of such alimony by the court unless the court finds that the circumstances upon which the award was based have not occurred or unless the payer spouse or partner demonstrates an agreement or good cause to the contrary.

Alimony shall terminate upon the death of the payer spouse or partner, except that any arrearages that have accrued prior to the date of the payer spouse's or partner's death shall not be vacated or annulled.

Nothing in this act shall be construed to prohibit a court from ordering either spouse or partner to maintain life insurance for the protection of the former spouse, partner, or the children of the marriage or civil union in the event of the payer spouse's or partner's death.

this case is bad for landlord permitted removal of eviction of commercial tenant to Superior Court MASTER AUTO PARTS, INC. v. M. & M. SHOES

this case is bad for landlord permitted removal of eviction of commercial tenant to Superior Court

MASTER AUTO PARTS, INC. v. M. & M. SHOES, INC.

105 N.J. Super. 49 (1969)

251 A.2d 135

MASTER AUTO PARTS, INC., A CORPORATION OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. M. & M. SHOES, INC., A CORP. OF NEW JERSEY, MORRIS RUBINSTEIN, AND M & M DISCOUNT CENTER, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Decided March 14, 1969.

Mr. Mark A. Baumgarten argued the cause for defendants-appellants (Messrs. Shevick & Ravich,attorneys).

Mr. Hyman Isaac argued the cause for plaintiff-respondent (Messrs. Reibel, Isaac & Tannenbaum,attorneys).

Before Judges SULLIVAN, FOLEY and LEWIS.

The opinion of the court was delivered by SULLIVAN, S.J.A.D.

Defendant, pursuant to leave granted, appeals from an order of the trial court denying its application under N.J.S. 2A:18-60 to transfer a summary proceeding, for the removal of a tenant, from the county district court into the Superior Court. For reasons hereinafter detailed, we conclude that the application should have been granted.

Plaintiff is the owner-landlord of certain commercial premises in the Borough of Roselle. Defendant is the tenant (the three named defendants will be referred to in the singular). The main portion of the premises is occupied under a long-term lease which provides for a monthly rental of $400. The attic is also occupied under an oral lease with a monthly rental of $100.

In September 1968 plaintiff filed a summary proceeding to remove the tenant, alleging (except for the oral lease of the attic) that the tenant had failed and refused to pay for utilities consumed and used by it at the premises since October 1963, in violation of a covenant of the lease. It was not charged that the tenant was in default in the payment of rent.

Defendant filed a motion to transfer the proceeding to the Superior Court, and in its supporting affidavit averred that it conducts a substantial retail business at the location, has expended large sums of money in the improvement of 

[105 N.J. Super. 52]

the leased premises in order to make them suitable for business purposes, and has made a large investment in establishing its reputation and building good will at the location. Defendant asserted that it had a good defense to the tenancy suit.

At the hearing before the trial court it was revealed that the landlord has entered into a contract to sell the premises to Acme Supermarkets, which contract calls for delivery of the premises free and clear of tenancies. In denying the motion, the trial court observed that the county district court was "perfectly capable" of determining the issues involved.

By statute, proceedings in the county district court for the removal of a tenant are heard in a summary manner and are not appealable except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. N.J.S. 2A:18-59. The action is designed to afford the landlord a speedy and inexpensive method of recovering possession of his property. However, the statute recognizes that certain types of proceedings to remove a tenant involve rights or issues too important to be heard in a summary manner without a right of appeal. Accordingly, the statute provides that either party may apply to the Superior Court which may, "if it deems it of sufficient importance," order the cause transferred to the Superior Court, where it shall be tried before a jury, unless a jury is waived, and shall be appealable.

We have no decisions in this State directly interpreting the statutory language "of sufficient importance." However, recent tenancy cases dealing with commercial leases of business properties have pointed out that the removal procedure was available. See Vineland Shopping Center, Inc. v. DeMarco, 35 N.J. 459(1961); Carteret Properties v. Variety Donuts, Inc., 49 N.J. 116 (1967). In McCrory Stores Corp. v. S.M. Braunstein, Inc., 99 N.J.L. 166 (E. & A. 1923), the court, in referring to a tenancy proceeding in the then district court, with its restricted right of review, stated:

[105 N.J. Super. 53]

"It may not be out of place to add that the legislature has not left the tenant of a great store, factory, hotel, &c., wholly to the mercy of a small cause court; for by statute the tenant may * * * apply to a justice of the [former] Supreme Court, who, if he deem the case of sufficient importance, may order a removal into the [former] Circuit Court, where it shall be tried * * * and writ of error lies therefrom to the Supreme Court. * * *" (at p. 169)

It has been stated that the application to transfer a tenancy proceeding is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. Carteret Properties v. Variety Donuts, Inc., supra, 49 N.J., at p. 130. However, discretion means legal discretion in the exercise of which the trial judge must take account of the applicable law and the particular circumstances of the case, to the end that a just result is reached. If he goes wide of the mark, the appellate court has a duty to act. Kavanaugh v. Quigley, 63 N.J.Super. 153 (App. Div.1960); Fanwood v. Rocco, 59 N.J.Super. 306 (App. Div. 1960), affirmed 33 N.J. 404 (1960); State v. Johnson, 67 N.J.Super. 414 (App. Div. 1961).

In the instant case the property involved is a commercial building, the major part of which the tenant occupies under a long-term lease. It conducts its retail business at that location. It can hardly be denied that ouster from these premises would seriously affect the tenant, which represents that it has expended large sums of money in improving these premises and has made a large investment in establishing its reputation and good will at the location.

It is also worthy of note that the alleged breach of the written lease relates to the alleged nonpayment of bills for utilities since October 1963, and that the landlord did not see fit to bring removal proceedings against the tenant, and charge a breach of the lease, until September 1968, and after it had entered into a contract to sell the premises free and clear of tenancies.

All of the foregoing circumstances add up to a situation in which the summary proceeding procedure in the county district court, with its restricted right of review, was not 

[105 N.J. Super. 54]

appropriate. The matter was "of sufficient importance" within the meaning of the statute and should have been transferred to the Superior Court.

The order denying defendant's motion is vacated and the matter remanded with direction that the proceedings be transferred to the Superior Court under N.J.S. 2A:18-60.